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Bombs, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and proxy forces are growth industries in the modern fight.  As 
President Obama identified in an address covering the nation’s strategy in Syria, “airstrikes, Special 
Forces, and working with local forces who are fighting to regain control of their own country -- that is 
how we’ll achieve a more sustainable victory.”[i]  These remarks capture the nation’s current policy for 
combating terrorist threats.  From its origins in the Second World War to present day, the history of SOF 
is written in clandestine operations.  By design, the charter for clandestine operations resides in the gray 
area between overt military operations and covert operations.  When operating in this gray area, the use of 
civilian clothing to reduce a military signature can be an essential factor for concealment.  Yet, under 
international law, this form of camouflage, if performed during military operations against a belligerent, is 
considered perfidy and therefore universally prohibited.  While there are no means under the Geneva 
Conventions to consider most acts of perfidy as legally acceptable, an analysis of both international and 
U.S. military legal boundaries for perfidy, military deception, and clandestine operations highlight 
potential areas for reform.  With these concerns in mind, the United States should petition a 
reclassification of perfidy from the United Nations to ensure the legal protections and force protection of 
SOF while conducting clandestine operations.
Perfidy
The parameters for military actions considered as perfidy are outlined in the protocols of the Geneva 
Conventions and other established and customary international humanitarian laws which form the basis 
for the Laws of Armed Conflict.  Article 37 of the Geneva Convention of June 1977 explicitly prohibits 
perfidy defining it as “[a]cts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is 
entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict, with intent to betray that confidence.”[ii]  In other words, it is illegal to deceive an adversary with 
the intent to kill or injure.  The formation of this concept began with the Hague Convention in 1907 which 
was the first multi-national treaty to define the lawful conduct of war and combatant status.[iii]  This 
treaty provided the first accepted principle of discrimination intending to distinguish between lawful 
combatants and non-combatants stating:
laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps 
fulfilling the following conditions: 1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates; 2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 3. To carry arms 
openly; and 4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.[iv]
Therefore, to conduct operations congruent with “the laws and customs of war,” combatants must display 
a non-removable symbol that is distinctive from afar and openly carry their weapons.  The standards 
supporting this principle of distinction were further incorporated into established international law through 
Article 4 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 and are now key parts to the Laws of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC).  As stated in the most current version of the U.S. Army’s Operational Law Handbook, LOAC 
mandates that “belligerents distinguish combatants from civilians and military objectives from civilian 
objectives.”[v]  By adhering to this principle, lawful belligerents may not use civilian clothing to reduce 
military signature and enhance the force protection means of military personnel to guard against their 
enemies’ attacks.  Furthermore, LOAC plainly distinguishes the difference between lawful and unlawful 
combatants (i.e. privileged and unprivileged belligerents) through several means.  Lawful combatants are 
generally “military personnel engaging in hostilities in an armed conflict on behalf of a party to the 
conflict” and, as a result, “bear no criminal responsibility for killing or injuring enemy military personnel 
or civilians taking an active part in hostilities.”[vi]  On the other hand, unlawful combatants, including 
spies, saboteurs, or civilians, are those who “directly participate [sic] in hostilities or who otherwise 
engage in unauthorized attacks or combatant acts.”[vii]  Given that these actions are considered 
“unauthorized” under LOAC, if captured these personnel are not only denied the rights afforded to 
prisoners of war (POWs) under Article 4 of Geneva Convention (III), but they may also be tried as war 
criminals after the conflict.[viii]  With this information in mind, there appears to be no legal defense for 
conducting any military operations, regardless of an overt or clandestine nature, in any clothing other than 
a distinctive military uniform. In fact, if captured while conducting military operations in a reduced 
military signature, the personnel involved could be “tried under the laws of the capturing nation” for 
espionage.[ix]  Despite these clear distinctions for perfidy, international humanitarian laws do permit 
certain forms of military deception.
Military Deception
In contrast to perfidy, military acts of deception are authorized under both the Geneva Conventions and 
corresponding LOAC standards.  Article 37 (2) of the Geneva Convention defines such “ruses” as “acts 
which are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of 
international law applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious because they do not invite the 
confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law.”[x]  Under these standards, the use 
of civilian clothing to reduce the military appearance of armed forces personnel would be considered 
viable means of camouflage.  Next, the Operational Law Handbook highlights the legality of military 
deception as established by the Lieber Code in 1863 stating that “deception in war is admitted as a just 
and necessary means of hostility, and is consistent with honorable warfare.” [xi] On the other hand, Liber 
Code also highlights that “clandestine or treacherous attempts to injure an enemy, because they are so 
dangerous [and] difficult to guard against” are subject to capital punishment.[xii] Obviously, the fine line 
between perfidy and military deception presents a gray area for military forces with severe consequences 
for misjudgment.
Clandestine Operations
Both established international law and U.S. military operational law fail to make a clear distinction 
between espionage and authorized military clandestine operations.  Joint Publication 3-05 describes 
clandestine as “[a]n activity or operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or 
agencies with the intent to assure secrecy and concealment.”[xiii]  This definition provides a basis for the 
concept of authorized military clandestine operations, but it also holds no legal authority.  International 
law, on the other hand, links clandestine operations with espionage.  Beginning with the Declaration on 
the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, the United Nations 
maintains that it is “[t]he duty of the State to refrain from armed intervention, subversion, military 
occupation or any other form of intervention and interference, overt or covert, directed at another State or 
group of States.”[xiv]  With this declaration, the United Nations establishes a clear position against 
State(s) intervention violating another State’s sovereignty across the range from military operations from 
overt to covert.  Next, Article 46 of the Geneva Convention describes espionage as “gather[ing]or 
attempts to gather information of military value…under false pretenses or deliberately in a clandestine 
manner.”[xv]  While this article does provide protection for members of the armed forces conducting such 
acts, this protection only applies if the military member is wearing a uniform to clearly distinguish 
themselves as lawful combatants.[xvi]  Furthermore, Rule 107 of international humanitarian law states 
that “combatants who wear civilian attire or who wear the uniform of the adversary” are considered spies 
and, therefore, do not have the right to POW status if captured.[xvii]
Not only does international law fail to protect members of the armed forces conducting clandestine 
operations, the United States’ military’s own Operational Law Handbook upholds the same 
restrictions.Despite these constraints, U.S. operational law provides two caveats on clandestine actions 
considered as espionage that are worth highlighting.First, under the United States’ accepted definitions, 
espionage is not considered a LOAC violation.[xviii]  Second, “reaching friendly lines immunizes the spy 
for past espionage activities.”[xix]  These caveats provide a baseline for the argument supporting 
clandestine operations by members of the armed forces.  While not considered legally acceptable under 
current international laws and practices, there is sufficient reason to reconsider certain activities that are 
not a LOAC violation and would not require trial in the international courts if revealed after reaching 
friendly lines.
Issue Discussion
The gap in international law between prohibited acts of perfidy and lawful acts of camouflage as means of 
military deception is most prevalent for SOF.  By their nature, SOF are intended to operate in a 
clandestine or low visibility manner to navigate hostile, denied, or politically sensitive operational 
environments.[xx]  Under Title 10 to the United States Code (USC), the United States Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM) has authority to direct special operations forces while conducting: “direct action, 
strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, psychological 
operations, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, theater search and rescue, and such other activities 
as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense.”[xxi]  It is possible for SOF operations 
to have legal protection while supporting authorized national intelligence operations of other federal 
intelligence agencies under authorities as expressly outlined in Title 50 USC.  However, the predominance 
of SOF operations will fall under Title 10 USC authorities.  Furthermore, the conduct of these authorized 
Title 10 USC military operations could require SOF to wear civilian clothing without openly carrying 
weapons and a fixed distinctive emblem to signify their element as a lawful combatant; herein lies the 
problem.
If captured by their enemy in the execution of such operations, these elements could potentially lose their 
fundamental legal protections as POWs and lawful combatant immunity from trial as a spy by a foreign 
government.  As a result, it seems unreasonable to expect that lawful combatants would be able to 
designate themselves as members of foreign armed forces prior to a hostile engagement, especially in the 
instances of time sensitive SOF engagements, such as raids or ambushes.  With the utilization of SOF in 
asymmetric operating environments becoming most common than ever before in American history, it is 
clear the United States should address this flaw in international humanitarian law as soon as possible to 
ensure the safety and protection of armed forces personnel abroad.
There is certainly good reason for the restrictions against attacking an enemy while wearing civilian 
clothing.  Asymmetric threats such as “Green on Blue” attacks provide a salient reminder for the need to 
maximize force protection measures in the modern operational environment.  Since 2008, independent 
research shows that at least 150 international troops have been killed in Afghanistan, with another 187 
wounded, as the result of attacks from friendly partner forces, commonly referred to as “Green on Blue” 
attacks.[xxii]  Although decreasing in frequency in recent years, this style of disguised attack remains a 
threat to the force.  The United States should not seek any revision to international law that could provide 
sanction to the enemy’s use of such actions.  Instead, the United States should tailor these revisions to 
explicitly outline the distinctions between authorized overt, clandestine, and covert military activities and 
terrorist acts.  While this distinction presents another challenge given the uncertainty in the fog of war, it 
is necessary to separate these activities to fully understand the operational environment.
This argument is complicated and nuanced.  Accordingly, there are several considerations worth mention 
to properly frame the discussion.  First, the protections provided by the Geneva Conventions for POWs 
are only valid when lawful combatants are captured by parties to those agreements.  Terrorist 
organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, do not recognize any 
rights afforded to POWs in the Geneva Conventions as they have repeatedly demonstrated.  Nonetheless, 
U.S. military personnel should still seek additional refinement to the governing international laws to 
reform a glaring oversight.  Second, it should be highlighted that the basis for the principle of distinction 
in LOAC and the Geneva Conventions comes from a document developed and signed in 1907.  Given the 
extensive evolution operational environment since in the century of warfare since that time, it could be 
reasonably argued that this principle, along with details contained therein, is in dire need of 
reexamination.  Finally, although the United States is not a signatory to the 1977 Protocol I Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions, it has acknowledged that the Additional Protocol provisions constitute a 
codification of customary international that is legally binding.[xxiii]  In other words, the U.S. has not 
officially agreed to all portions of the Geneva Conventions but understands that its representatives can be 
held to these provisions under customary international law.
Conclusion
The fine line between prohibited acts of perfidy and lawful camouflage in support of clandestine 
operations creates a significant challenge.  The classification of clandestine operations with acts of 
espionage further exacerbates this issue putting our nation’s SOF at a considerable risk of losing their 
rightful protections as lawful combatants under international law.  When combined with the high physical 
risk of these operations, this is places an undue burden on members of SOF.  More than ever before, this 
country and its allies abroad leverage their significant special operations capabilities to combat multiple 
existential threats to national security.  Furthermore, clandestine operations provide a significant benefit to 
the nation’s defense and it is time to ensure the proper protection for SOF executing authorized military 
operations.
The United States has reached a modern-day impasse requiring the attention of the international 
community.  To improve the legal protection for SOF personnel operating abroad, the United States 
should request a specific revision to international humanitarian laws (namely, the Article 4 of the Geneva 
Convention).  To initiate the revision process, the United States’ representative to the United Nations 
should petition the General Assembly to address the specific instances where lawful combatants, utilizing 
civilian clothing to enhance force protection as a means of camouflage, become engaged in hostile contact 
with another belligerent.  Concurrently, the United States and its international allies should coalesce a 
broad base of support in the international community to ensure success against inevitable rebuke from 
traditional international opponents to these types of united actions (e.g. North Korea, Iran, and Russia).  
Though ostensibly creating yet another loophole for an asymmetric enemy or belligerent nation with 
malign intentions to exploit, this revision should highlight the effort to create adequate legal protection for 
lawful combatants where presently none exists.  Various terrorist entities choose to ignore the majority of 
international law governing the conduct of lawful warfare.  As a result, this revision should also highlight 
that any additional legal protection created would only be of benefit to those who follow the established 
international legal boundaries for the conduct of war.
Presently, adherence to the international standards for lawful combatants betrays SOF to their enemy.  
While it is impossible to remove all ambiguity from the nature of armed conflict, this is clearly one area 
where more can be done to protect lawful combatants.  SOF prides themselves on being able to operate in 
the gray but this should not require forfeiture of legal protection in the event of capture.  POW status and 
right to trial following capture are fundamental rights to all lawful combatants and should not be denied 
regardless of nature of the USC Title 10 mission.  Therefore, this suggested revision is necessary to 
protect the force and correct a clear oversight international law.  Absent this revision, SOF will continue 
to execute their nation’s highest priorities without the proper legal protection, and that can no longer be 
acceptable.
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